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Boom-bust cycles and stabilisation policy – monetary  
and macroprudential rules: a loss function approach 
Caterina Mendicino and Maria Teresa Punzi
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1.   Summary 
The recent financial crises have posed a challenge to the conduct of financial stability and 
monetary policy. The international debate mainly focused on the potential benefits of 
reducing procyclicality in financial intermediation in order to avoid boom and bust cycles in 
the supply of credit. We study the stabilisation benefits of macroprudential and monetary 
policy rules that react to indicators of financial imbalances. In particular, we contribute to an 
investigation of the benefits of dampening credit cycles and explore the effectiveness of 
alternative policy instruments, such as the interest rate and the loan-to-value ratio (LTV 
henceforth), for macroeconomic and financial stabilisation.  
Lambertini et al (2010) show that expectation of future macroeconomic developments can 
generate boom-bust cycles in housing prices and credit.
2 Housing-market cycles driven by 
expectations on future developments in the demand and supply of houses are characterised 
by boom-bust dynamics in both housing prices and housing investment. However, only 
expectations of a future reduction in the supply of houses also generate boom-bust cycles in 
all aggregate quantities such as output, consumption and investment, as in the data.
3 
Relying on a model that allows for macroeconomic booms and busts driven by expectations 
on the supply of houses, we draw some policy implications. In particular, we evaluate the 
performance of macroprudential and monetary policy in terms of macroeconomic 
stabilisation. We postulate that, apart from inflation and output stabilisation, the policymaker 
also aims to dampen credit cycles. Our findings highlight a role for LTV ratios that respond in 
a countercyclical manner to indicators of financial imbalances. LTV ratio rules that actively 
respond to credit growth reduce the volatility of credit-to-GDP and other macroeconomic 
variables. In the presence of an active LTV ratio policy, we find no gains from an interest-rate 
response to credit aggregates. Pursuing financial stability goals with policy instruments other 
than the policy rate delivers a better outcome in terms of both macroeconomic and financial 
stabilisation.  
The goal of this article is to provide insight into the role of monetary and macroprudential 
policy in leaning against boom-bust cycles. This article relies on recent research by 
Lambertini et al (2011) that evaluates monetary and macroprudential policy in terms of both 
macroeconomic stabilisation and welfare. Differently from Lambertini et al (2011), we 
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document the importance of an active LTV ratio policy based on a simplified analysis that 
relies on a loss function approach. The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 
presents the model. Section 3 illustrates boom-bust cycles as generated by expectations for 
housing market trends. Section 4 explores the effectiveness of stabilisation policy in the 
presence of boom-bust cycles. 
2.   The model 
In this section we briefly describe the model economy. The framework follows Iacoviello and 
Neri (2010). The economy is populated by two types of households: savers and borrowers. 
They both consume  t c , accumulate housing  t h , and work in the production of consumption 
goods  t c n ,  and housing  t h n , . They differ in their discount factor. Borrowers (denoted by ′) 
feature a relatively lower subjective discount factor that in equilibrium generates an incentive 
to anticipate future consumption to the current period through borrowing. Hence, the ex-ante 
heterogeneity induces credit flows between the two types of agents. This modelling feature 
was introduced in macro models by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). 
Borrowers maximise the utility function 
 
subject to the budget constraint 
 
Except for the gross nominal interest rate R, all the variables are expressed in real terms;  t   
is gross inflation   1  t t P P ,  t c w , '  and  t h w , '  are the wages paid in the two sectors of 
production, and  t q  is the price of housing in real terms. Houses depreciate at rate  h  . The 
parameter  t j  is an AR(1) shock that represents a shift in preference for housing with respect 
to consumption and leisure. The degree of habit persistence in consumption is measured by 


















Limits on borrowing are introduced through the assumption that households cannot borrow 
more than a fraction m of the next-period value of the housing stock. 
The savers face a similar problem. However, they also invest in capital and receive the 
profits of the firms. As in Smets and Wouters (2007), households supply labour to unions that 
differentiate labour services and sell them to wholesale labour packers in a monopolistic 
market. Wages can be adjusted subject to a Calvo scheme with a given probability every 
period. The wholesale labour packers transform the services into homogeneous labour 
composites,  t c n , ,  t c n , ' ,  t h n , ,  t h n , ' , to be sold to final producing firms in a competitive market. 60  BIS Papers No 60
 
 
Final good producing firms produce non-durable goods (Y) and new houses (IH) facing 
Cobb-Douglas production functions and use capital, k, and labour supplied by the savers, n, 
and the borrowers, n′ as inputs of production 
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The housing sector also uses land l and an intermediate input  b k , to produce new houses. 
t h A ,  measures productivity in the housing sector and is assumed to follow an AR(1) process. 
Firms pay the wages to households and repay the rented capital to the savers. Retailers, 
owned by the savers, differentiate final goods and act in a competitive monopolistic market. 
Prices can be adjusted with probability     1  every period, by following a Calvo-setting. In 
contrast, housing prices are assumed to be flexible. 
We assume that the central bank follows a Taylor-type rule as estimated by Iacoviello and 
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where rr is the steady state real interest rate,  t R u ,  is a monetary policy shock, GDP is defined 
as the sum of consumption and investment at steady state prices, and the central bank’s 
target is assumed to be time varying and subject to a persistent shock,  t s A , . 
3.   Introducing boom-bust cycles into the model 
According to Iacoviello and Neri (2010), fluctuations in the housing market are mainly 
generated by shocks to the demand and supply of houses. However, housing market shocks 
lead to an increase in housing prices, but cannot generate either hump-shaped dynamics, or 
the co-movement in consumption, investment and GDP observed during house price booms. 
According to Lambertini et al (2010), expectations of future macroeconomic developments 
can generate boom-bust cycles in housing prices and credit in accordance with the empirical 
evidence. In the following, we report the dynamics of the model in response to expectations 
of future changes in housing demand and supply.
4 Figure 1 shows the model response to 
expectations of lower productivity in the housing sector. We illustrate the case in which 
agents anticipate a shock that hits the economy only in period T= 4 that turns out to be wrong 
and at time T=4 there are no changes.
5 
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Expectations of a future decline in housing productivity generate expectations of rising house 
prices. Borrowers increase their current housing demand for speculative purposes. 
Household indebtedness increases, reinforcing the increase in current expenditures in both 
housing and consumption goods. Due to increased housing demand, current housing prices 
and housing investment rise. Moreover, agents increase their current labour supply in order 
to smooth the negative future effect of the shock on future labour income. When news about 
a future change in productivity spreads, firms start adjusting the stock of capital in order to 
reduce the future cost of adjusting capital as an input of production, induced by the presence 
of adjustment cost in capital. The stock of capital used as an input of production in the 
housing sector decreases over time. In contrast, firms in the consumption-good sector start 
increasing their stock of capital. Despite the decline in capital used in the housing sector, 
current business investment slightly increases. As a result, GDP rises. A four-period 
anticipated decline in productivity generates a boom in housing prices, housing investment, 
consumption, GDP, hours and indebtedness. The peak response of all aggregate variables 
corresponds to the time in which expectations are realised. If expectations are not realised, 
there is a dramatic drop in both quantities and prices. Thus, expectations of a negative 
housing supply shock that are not realised generate a housing market boom-bust cycle. 
Expectations of future increases in housing demand generate a boom dynamic in housing 
prices and investment, but fail to account for co-movement between residential and non-
residential investment. In fact, in anticipation of a shift in preference towards consumption, 
the stock of capital declines in the consumption-good sector. As a result, business 
investment falls. See Lambertini et al (2010) for further discussion on the sources of booms 
and busts in the housing market. 
4.   Macroeconomic and financial stabilisation 
In the following, we assume that fluctuations in the model are driven by housing demand and 
supply shocks. In order to allow for booms and busts in house prices and credit we also 
introduce expectations related to housing supply. Given the difficulty in identifying the source 
of fluctuations, we characterise monetary and macroprudential policy under a mixture of 
changes into both current and expected economic conditions. The model’s parameters are 
set according to the estimated mean values presented by Iacoviello and Neri (2010) for the 
US economy. 
Macroeconomic and financial stability goals are summarised by the following loss function 
,
2 2 2
y b y b k k k L         
   
where 
2   is the variance of credit growth, inflation and GDP growth. 
First, we investigate the effectiveness of macroprudential policy in providing a stable 
provision of credit over the cycle. In particular, we explore the role of the loan-to-value ratio 
that responds counter-cyclically to credit growth as an observable indicator of financial 
imbalances. Thus, 
    1 1 1 1         t t x m m t m t b b v v m v m v m  
                                                                                                                                                      
change n quarters in advance  n t z  ,  , so that,  n t z t z t z u    , , ,   , where  t z,   is i.i.d. and z = {h, j}. Thus, at 
time t, agents receive a signal about future macroeconomic conditions at time t + n: if the expected movement 
doesn’t occur, then  n t z t z    , ,    and  0 ,  t z u . 62  BIS Papers No 60
 
 
where m is the steady state value for the LTV ratio,  m v  is an autoregressive parameter that 
we set equal to 0.5, and  x v  is the response to credit growth. We choose the parameters of 
the LTV rule that minimises the volatility of credit aggregates ( 0  b k ,  0   y k k ) assuming 
that the monetary authority follows the estimated Taylor-type rule (see Table 1). 
Responding to credit growth is successful in dampening credit cycles. A strong 
countercyclical response to credit growth directly counters the boom in credit driven by 
expectations of rising house prices and the subsequent bust. Thus, compared to the 
benchmark case, it better stabilises credit aggregates without increasing the volatility of 
inflation and GDP. Table 2 shows the unconditional standard deviation of few key variables 
in the model. 
Second, we investigate how, in the absence of an active macroprudential policy, monetary 
policy can reduce macroeconomic fluctuations and affect the magnitude of credit cycles. We 






































   
Under a passive macroprudential policy, an interest rate response to credit growth yields 
sizable gains in terms of financial stabilisation. However, interest rate rules that aim at 
financial stability goals ( 0  b k ) do not deliver the best outcome in terms of macroeconomic 
and financial stabilisation. The optimal countercyclical LTV rule that responds to credit 
growth is more successful than an interest rate response to credit growth in reducing the 
volatility of credit-to-GDP and it also reduces fluctuations in GDP and inflation. 
In the interaction between macroprudential and monetary policy we find that pursuing 
financial stability goals with LTV ratios delivers the lowest volatility of credit-to-GDP. 
Moreover, it is also more successful in lowering the volatility of inflation and GDP. The use of 
countercyclical LTV ratio policies improves macroeconomic and financial stabilisation and 
there are no gains from an interest rate response to credit aggregates. However, compared 
to the benchmark case, none of these policies significantly affects the volatility of house 
prices. 
To summarise, in the presence of expectation-driven boom-bust cycles in housing prices and 
credit, the use of the LTV ratio as a macroprudential tool improves upon interest-rate rules 
that respond to credit growth in terms of both macroeconomic and financial stabilisation. 
Thus, these findings highlight the beneficial effect of macroprudential tools in mitigating credit 
cycles. Our results suggest that further work on macroprudential policy frameworks aimed at 










Optimal stabilisation policy 
Loss functions 
LTV   kb=1, kπ=ky=0 kb=0, kπ=ky=1 kb=kπ=ky=1 
vb= -136.865  1.21371e-007    
R      
απ= 37.6331, αy=38.2875




   1.42644e-006   
απ= 10.7144, αy=1.73584
       0.00580687 
απ=1.85184 , αy= -0.333143, αb=2.71008     0.00022085 
R & LTV       
vb=  -165.406, απ= 969.023, αy=971.556     1.50494e-006 






Optimal stabilisation policy 
Volatility 
Benchmark (estimated interest rate rule)  b/GDP q  π GDP 
απ= 1.40444 , αy= 0.51261, αR
= 0.59913  0.1471 0.2346  0.0010 0.0208 
LTV       
vb= -136.865  0.0361 0.2349  0.0007 0.0207 




  0.1323 0.2344  0.0009 0.0185 
απ=1.85184 , αy= -0.333143, αb=2.71008  0.0518 0.2342  0.0038 0.0253 
R & LTV         
vb=  -165.406, απ= 969.023, αy=971.556  0.0320 0.2348  0.0008 0.0187 
vb=-10.2081  , απ= 4.02385, αy=2.36347 , αb=-0.932216  0.0715 0.2346  0.0014 0.0190 
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